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Lethal Injection and the Right of Access: The Intersection of the Eighth and First Amendments
By: Timothy F. Brown
Introduction
The Spring and Summer of 2014 have witnessed renewed debate on the constitutionality
of the death penalty after a series of high profile legal battles concerning access to lethal
injection protocols and subsequent questionable executions. Due to shortages in the drugs
traditionally used for the lethal injection, States have changed their lethal injection protocols to
shield information from both the prisoners and the public. Citing public safety concerns, the
States refuse to release information concerning the procurement of the drugs to the public. Such
obstruction hinders the public’s ability to determine the cruelty of the punishment imposed and
creates the potential for unconstitutional execution. Within the coming years, the Supreme Court
will be faced with deciding the extent of the public’s right of access to government proceedings
and that right’s effect on lethal injections.
The State of Ohio executed Dennis McGuire on January 19, 2014.1 The execution of
McGuire involved the use of a new drug to administer the lethal injection.2 Rather than the
traditional three-drug cocktail of sodium thiopental, pancuronum bromide, and potassium
chloride,3 Ohio opted to use only two drugs: “midazolam, a sedative and anesthetic, and
hydromorphone, a painkiller and morphine derivative.”4 Officials expected the change of drugs
would not prolong the typical five-minute execution.5
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After strapping McGuire to a gurney, the prison officials inserted an IV into his arm
before injecting him with the lethal drugs.6 Three minutes into his execution, McGuire told his
family members present at his execution that he loved them. 7 A minute later, his stomach began
to swell, as if he had a sudden hernia.8 Then for the next eleven minutes, McGuire gurgled as if
struggling for breath and clenched his fists.9 One witness described McGuire’s death “much like
a fish lying along the shore puffing for that one gasp of air that would allow it to breathe.”10
Once the loud breathing sounds subsided, medical technicians listened for a heartbeat for four
minutes before the warden pronounced McGuire dead.11

All told the typical five minute

execution took about twenty-five minutes from the time the drugs were injected to the time
McGuire was pronounced dead.12 An execution scheduled for the next week was postponed by
Ohio so that the state could reevaluate its lethal injection procedure in light of McGuire’s
execution.13
A week prior to McGuire’s execution, the State of Oklahoma executed Michael Lee
Wilson.14

Like Ohio, Oklahoma did not use the typical three-drug cocktail for Wilson,

substituting sodium thiopental for pentobarbital.15 Although he showed no outward signs of
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pain, twenty seconds after the administering of the injection, Wilson called out: “I feel my whole
body burning.”16
On July 23, 2014, Arizona executed Joseph R. Wood, III. 17 Instead of the typical five to
ten minute procedure, Mr. Wood’s execution lasted an astonishing hour and fifty-seven
minutes.18 During the procedure, Mr. Wood coughed, gurgled, and gasped over 600 times for
air.19 State officials have maintained the appropriateness of the medical procedures involved in
the execution.20 The initial, physical autopsy of Wood indicated that the IVs were “perfectly
placed” and “the catheters in each arm were completely within the veins and there was no
leakage of any kind… anything that was put through the IVs went into the veins.” 21 Questions
remain about the actual drugs used in the proceeding. Arizona had used the new two-drug
cocktail of the midazolam and hydromorphone previously used in the McGuire execution.22
However, execution logs indicate that Wood was actually injected with dosage fifteen times
more than the dosage required in the most up-to-date Arizona execution protocols.23
Common to these recent executions has been the alteration of the typical three-drug
cocktail due to shortages of the drug sodium thiopental.24 Most of the bulk-suppliers of sodium
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thiopental are companies within the European Union, which openly supports the abolition of the
death penalty throughout the world.25

In 2011, the EU prohibited the export of sodium

thiopental to countries that administer lethal injections.26 As a result, the states that administer
the lethal injection have had to find new means of securing the drugs necessary to carry out the
sentences. Some states, such as Missouri, have sought the use of local pharmacists to create a
compound to use during lethal injections.27 Others have relied upon stockpiled reserves of
sodium thiopental, which typically has a four-year shelf life.28
In the face of this drug shortage, the death penalty states have become increasingly
secretive about where they have received their drugs. The states hide behind various statutes and
regulations that shield the identity of the executioner from the public. They claim that the
identity of the drug manufacturer, whether a compounding pharmacy or a pharmaceutical
company, counts as part of the instrumentalities of the execution.29 To release such information
could hinder later attempts by the states to acquire more of the drugs due to outside pressures on
the companies not to do business with the state.30 Accordingly, the states argue that the public
and the condemned inmate do not have a right to the information.
This article does not attempt to argue for the abolition of the death penalty and accepts
Chief Justice Roberts’ assertion that “[c]apital punishment is constitutional… it necessarily
follows that there must be a means of carrying it out.”31 However, the constitutionality of capital
punishment is still governed by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment, which “draw[s] its meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the
25
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progress of a maturing society.”32

What this article argues for is increased access to the

procedures of lethal injection in order to enable the public to have a true understanding of the
Eighth Amendment and the constitutional boundaries of lethal injections. By denying the public
access to all of the information surrounding executions, the states ensure the failure of Justice
Marshall’s hypothesis that a well-informed public would reject the death penalty.33
The concept of the informed citizenry has its basis in the First Amendment.34 This article
will explore the use of the First Amendment as a tool in death penalty litigation. In particular, it
will explore the viability of using First Amendment Right of Access jurisprudence to maneuver
around states’ attempts to limit the information surrounding executions. A First Amendment
claim can be helpful in two regards: 1) its success can delay the execution; and 2) it can gain
information for a subsequent Eighth Amendment claim.
Part I recounts the history of capital punishment in the American justice system
explaining how executions evolved from the very public events involving hangings to the
secretive affairs involving lethal injection today. Part II explores the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, with a particular focus on capital punishment. The second section
also considers how the Marshall Hypothesis should guide Eighth Amendment capital punishment
claims. Part III of the article focuses on the concept of the First Amendment Right of Access.
The idea of a public right of access to government proceedings has its roots in the notion that a
well-informed citizenry is essential for proper regulation of democratic governments. Part III
moreover analyzes the way the Supreme Court has interpreted the right of access in cases
concerning prison inmates. Part IV describes recent attempts by condemned prisoners to use the
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First Amendment Right of Access to delay their executions and gather information for potential
Eighth Amendment violations.
Finally, the article concludes by arguing that condemned men and women should first
bring suits based upon the First Amendment prior to any Eighth Amendment claim. Recent
decisions have severely limited the use of the Eighth Amendment as a starting point for litigation
because the inmates often lack the requisite information to make out a valid Eighth Amendment
claim.35 By bringing a First Amendment claim, the inmate can use the sword aspect of that
Amendment to gain the information needed to win on a subsequent Eighth Amendment claim.
Part I
One need look only to the early written legal codes to see that the death penalty was an
entrenched aspect of Western Civilization and its concept of justice. As the power of the
centralized state grew, the public execution served as a reminder to the people of the state’s
ultimate control over the individual’s life. While many of the first legal codes were concerned
more with community caretaking, as governmental power became more centralized, executions
became a means for the state to remind citizens where true power lay: with the sovereign. The
early public executions enabled the state to “display the majestic, awesome power of sovereignty
as it was materialized on the body of the condemned.”36 These early public executions ensured
that citizens knew their place within society as a whole. “Executions were designed to make the
state’s dealing in death majestically visible to all. Live, but live by the grace of the sovereign;
live, but remember that your life belongs to the state: these were the messages of the state killing
of an earlier era.”37 The public aspect of these executions also sought to deter others from
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committing the same offense, reminding the viewers of the consequence of trespassing against
the law.38
Although various means of execution have existed throughout history, death by hanging
became the most popular means of public execution within the English system and as such took
hold in the American colonies.39 Scholars believe that hanging as a form of execution arrived in
England by way of the invading Germanic tribes of the fifth century C.E.40 Hanging is a simple
means of execution, one that required little expertise.41 The executioner needed only a length of
rope to create the noose and a tree from which to hang the rope.42 Upon hoisting the condemned
up with the rope, gravity set to work as the condemned died from asphyxiation.43
While hanging provided an easy and accessible means for the state to execute convicts,
the death penalty in England was not a common sentence until around the Tudor Age. 44 William
the Conqueror, who reigned from 1066-87, used the death sentence rarely, reserving it mostly for
cases involving treason.45 Nearly five hundred years later during the reign of Henry VIII,
executions occurred at a rate of no less than two thousand a year.46
As previously mentioned, executions at this time were extremely public affairs, theater
for the common folk.47 By the Eighteenth Century, a well-orchestrated display followed the
conviction of a criminal. Upon pronouncement of his or her sentence, the condemned was
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executed the subsequent morning, provided the next morning was not a Sunday.48 In London,
the condemned were originally dragged three miles through the city streets to the place used for
hangings.49 Often the condemned died along the route as onlookers and passersby hurled refuse
and beat the condemned, preventing the public from viewing the ultimate spectacle.50
Consequently, the condemned was placed on an exposed cart as he or she traveled the three
miles to the site of execution.51 The original site in London consisted of trees from which the
noose was hung.52

Eventually, a portable scaffold was developed and used at the prison;

however, the portable scaffold was constructed outside the prison walls for the public to observe
the execution.53 In 1760, a scaffold with a trapdoor was developed so that when it was triggered,
the bottom fell away, allowing gravity to pull the condemned down and the noose to suffocate
the condemned.54

By 1783, executioners had developed a scaffold with a trapdoor which

permitted the execution of up to ten people simultaneously.55
Public executions became must-attend events in communities. People flocked to towns
for the chance to see an execution. One early Nineteenth Century contemporary describes
witnessing the events surrounding an aborted execution in Pennsylvania:
After the execution of Lechler had gratified the people about York and Lancaster
with the spectacle of his death, and had produced its proper complement of
homicide and other crimes, a poor wretch was condemned to suffer the same fate
in another part of the State of Pennsylvania, where the people had not yet been
indulged with such a spectacle. They therefore collected by the thousands and
tens of thousands. The victim was brought out. All the eyes in the living mass
that surrounded the gibbet were fixed on his countenance, and they waited with
strong desire, the expected signal for launching him into eternity. There was a
delay. They grew impatient; it was prolonged, and they were outrageous; cries
48
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like those which preceded the tardy rising of the curtain in a theater were heard.
Impatient for delight they expected in seeing a fellow-creature die, they raised a
ferocious cry. But, it was at last announced that a reprieve had left them no hope
of witnessing his agonies, their fury knew no bounds; and the poor maniac—for it
was discovered that he was insane—was with difficulty snatched by the officers
of justice from the fate which the most violent among them seemed determined to
inflict. This most awful and humiliating instance of the degrading depth to which
human nature may descend, occurred at a place called Orwigsburgh, in
Pennsylvania, and Mr. Livingston declares the picture by no means overcharged,
the name of the rescued maniac was Zimmerman.56
At the last public execution in Philadelphia in 1837, an estimated 20,000 people attended with
the hope of seeing James Moran hang.57
The first half of the Nineteenth Century witnessed the formation of a number of reform
movements in the United States, including the death penalty abolition movement. Growing out
of the prison reform movement, the abolitionists believed the death penalty to be another
example of inhume treatment of prisoners.58

The first major victory for the abolitionists

occurred in 1847 when Michigan became the first state to abandon the use of capital
punishment.59
As death penalty abolitionists began to gain momentum, proponents for the death penalty
sought to remove the public aspect of the sentence. States began to pass private execution laws
in which the execution would occur within the prison walls in the presence of a selected group of
witnesses.60 Abolitionists opposed these measures because they believed that if executions took
place in private, the public would not understand fully the consequences of a death sentence.61
The great social reformer Horace Greely believed that private executions “subtracted much of

56
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the force” from the abolitionist cause.62 Nevertheless, in 1833, Rhode Island became the first
state to enact a private execution law.63 By 1849, when Michigan had abolished the death
penalty, fifteen states had enacted private execution statutes.64 The passage of the private
execution laws did not completely eliminate public executions. Executions were a local affair
governed in many states by the local county sheriff.65 It was not until state governments took
control from the county sheriffs in the early Twentieth Century that public executions faded into
history.66 The last recorded public execution occurred on May 21, 1937 in the town of Galena,
Missouri.67
The latter half of the Nineteenth Century saw a movement to find more humane means to
execute prisoners. Wilkerson v. Utah,68 one of the first challenges to capital punishment heard
by the Supreme Court, upheld the use of a firing squad to execute a man convicted of first degree
murder. While recognizing the limits imposed by the Eighth Amendment, the Court found “that
the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in
the first degree is not included” in the ban on cruel and unusual punishments.69 The use of a
firing squad, however, is more of an outlier among execution methods as hanging remained the
more popular method.70
In 1885, New York authorized a commission to discover “whether the science of the
present day” could not find a less barbaric means to execute prisoners. After a thorough twoyear study, which considered every known method of execution, the commission suggested the
62
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use of the electric chair.71 The commission had considered the possibility of using some form of
lethal injection, but decided the procedure was impractical.72 “[T]he medical profession strongly
opposed the use of the hypodermic needle for executions, fearing that the public would associate
the practice of medicine with death.”73 In 1890, after the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the use
of the electric chair,74 William Kemmler became the first condemned prisoner to die by the
electric chair.75 After his execution, the electric chair gained acceptance as a humane means of
executing prisoners. By 1913, fifteen states had adopted the electric chair as the primary method
of execution.76 By 1949, the total number of states authorizing the use of the electric chair had
increased to twenty-six.77
Unlike hanging, which at its most rudimentary form required a rope and a tree, the
electric chair required more skill from the executioner to carry out the procedure. Mainly the
executioner needed familiarity with electricity.78 A contemporary newspaper account described
the method by which the electrical current would flow into Mr. Kemmler’s body:
Then come two switches, one for short circuiting the current, the other the fatal
switch which carries the current to the wires connecting with the body of the
condemned man. Two wires at the top connect with a dynamo 1,000 feet away in
the north wing of the prison. One of the wires at the bottom will be connected
with the metal cap to be worn on the head and the other will be adjusted to the
base of Kemmler’s spine.79
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The medical report of the first execution by electricity asserted: “the important fact remains that
unconsciousness was instantly effected, and death was painless.”80 The report also lauded the
humaneness of execution by electricity in contrast to hanging:
Compared with hanging, in which death is frequently produced by strangulation,
with every indication of conscious suffering for an appreciable time on the part of
the victim, execution by electricity is infinitely preferable, both as regards the
suddenness with which death is effected and the expedition with which all the
immediate preliminary details may be arranged. By the latter method the fatal
stroke renders its victim unconscious in an infinitesimal fraction of a second, so
small as to be beyond the power of the human mind to estimate, while, at the
same time, it disintegrates the nerve tissues and blood to an extent which insures
an absoluteness of death in a shorter space of time than is possible by any other
known method. In other words, it is the surest, quickest, most efficient, and least
painful method that has yet been devised.81
Despite these accolades for execution by electricity, the author of the report, Dr. C.E. Spitzka,
preferred the guillotine as a primary means of execution.82
The next advance in execution technology involved the adoption of lethal gas. In 1921,
Nevada became the first state to adopt lethal gas execution and end executions by hanging and
firing squad.83 Although lethal gas never surpassed the electric chair in popularity, by 1955
eleven states used lethal gas as their execution of choice.84 The promotion of lethal gas was
short lived. By 1994, states no longer viewed the gas chamber as an acceptable means of
execution.85
In the aftermath of Gregg v. Georgia86 which reopened the death penalty after a four year
moratorium, states looked to technological advances yet again to find a more humane execution
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method.87 States settled on execution by lethal injection because of the proposed humane and
economic benefits of the method.88 The first state to authorize lethal injection as a form of
execution was Oklahoma in 1977.89 By 1982, when the first execution by lethal injection was
performed, five states had adopted the method.90 As of 2013, lethal injection is the primary
method of execution in thirty-five states in addition to the United States military and the federal
government.91
As states passed legislation authorizing lethal injection, they faced the problem of finding
executioners with enough medical training to carry out the procedure. The medical profession
openly opposed doctor participation in lethal injection and threatened sanctions against members
who participated.92

When New Jersey authorized lethal injection, the state hired Fred A.

Leuchter, Jr. to construct a lethal injection machine that would remove the need for medical
specialists in administering the drug.93 Leuchter was not himself a medical expert, but selftaught in the intricacies of “the execution business” after entering the “business” in 1979.94
Leuchter advised sixteen states on execution equipment and sold his lethal injection machine for
an estimated $25,000 to four states—Illinois, Delaware, Missouri, and New Jersey.95 In late
1990, information surfaced that Leuchter held a bachelor’s degree in history and was not a
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licensed engineer.96 Massachusetts charged Leuchter “with fraudulently practicing engineering,”
to which he pled guilty.97
States often leave the specifics of the actual lethal injection protocol to the discretion of
the prison administration. Wyoming’s lethal injection statute provides information meant to
guide corrections officials during the execution by listing the types of permitted drugs for the
injection.98 In contrast, South Dakota has left much of the decision to the warden for how to
administer the lethal injection.99 For the most part, states are hesitant to release all information
about the execution protocols unless faced with litigation.100 The states will often cite fears of
prison security and the need to protect drug manufacturers from potential harassment from
abolitionist groups.101 While the states may differ on the minute details, the traditional lethal
injection consisted of a three-drug cocktail: first sodium thiopental, next pancuronium bromide,
and finally potassium chloride.102 Chief Justice Roberts explained the effects of the drugs:
The first drug, sodium thiopental… is a fast-acting barbiturate sedative that
induces a deep, comalike unconsciousness when given in the amounts used for
lethal injections… The second drug, pancuronium bromide… is a paralytic agent
that inhibits all muscular-skeletal movements and, by paralyzing the diaphragm,
stops respiration… Potassium chloride, the third drug, interferes with the
electrical signals that stimulate the contractions of the heart, inducing cardiac
arrest… The proper administration of the first drug ensures that the prisoner does
not experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by
the second and third drugs.103
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Once the condemned inmate is led into the execution chamber, the executioners fasten him or her
“to a gurney… insert a catheter into a vein, and inject a nonlethal solution. After the reading of a
death warrant, a lethal mixture is injected by one or more executioners or, depending upon the
state, by a machine.”104 From the first administration of the sodium thiopental, the execution
should last around five minutes.105
Recently, states have had to reconsider the three-drug cocktail due to shortages of the
first drug—sodium thiopental.

Hospira, the only U.S. manufacturer of sodium thiopental,

stopped production of the drug in 2011 because it opposed the use of the drug in executions.106
When states attempted to switch to pentobarbital as a substitute, the only American licensed
maker of the drug, the Danish company Lundbeck, Inc., announced a new distribution system of
the drug designed to keep the drug out of the execution chamber.107 By the end of 2011, the
European Union banned the export of “‘products which could be used for the execution of
human beings by means of lethal injection,’ including ‘short and intermediate acting barbiturate
anesthetic agents’ like pentobarbital and sodium thiopental.”108 In response to the shortage of
sodium thiopental, Missouri considered using the drug propofol as a substitute because of its
similar qualities to sodium thiopental.109 Unlike sodium thiopental, which is no longer a widely
accepted anesthetic in the medical community,110 propofol is still used by doctors for medical
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procedures.111 However, Missouri decided not to pursue that avenue because of fears propofol
would suffer the same fate from the European Union as sodium thiopental.112
States have also looked to new drug combinations in an effort to find alternatives to the
traditional three-drug lethal injection. Ohio, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Florida have begun to use
a two-drug combination of “hydromorphone, an opioid painkiller that suppresses breathing, and
midazolam, a sedative.”113

However, the States differ in regards to the actual dosage

administered during the execution. Florida uses 500 milligrams of midazolam and Oklahoma
uses 100 milligrams.114 Ohio’s and Arizona’s protocols call for 50 milligrams of the drug.115
Texas uses only one drug for lethal injection purposes: pentobarbital.116
The recent drug shortage has had tangible effects on state policies. First, as is the case
when supply is limited and the demand great, states have faced increased costs for the execution
drugs.117 Second and of more importance, states have begun to use compounding pharmacies to
supply the drugs needed for lethal injections.118 When using the compounding pharmacies, the
states sought the help of laws protecting the identity of members of the execution team, arguing
that the compounding pharmacies are members of the execution team.119 By denying access to
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information concerning the drug manufacturers, the states have transformed the execution from a
public event demonstrating the power of the state to uphold the community’s sense of justice to a
completely private and secretive event, hiding from the public one of the most tremendous
powers of the state—the power over life and death.
The recent shortages have also led some states to take questionable methods to acquire
the necessary drugs. In 2011, the Drug Enforcement Administration seized Georgia’s cache of
sodium thiopental.120 Federal authorities were concerned with the legality of the importation of
the drug from the United Kingdom.121 Georgia bought the drugs from the British company
Dream Pharma, which apparently “operated out of the back of a London driving school.” 122 In
response to the importation problems, the Food and Drug Administration declared that “in
‘defer[ence] to law enforcement’ agencies, henceforth it would exercise its ‘enforcement
discretion not to review [shipments of sodium thiopental] and allow processing through
[Customs’] automated system for importation.’”123 Death row inmates from Arizona, California,
and Tennessee sued the FDA for violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act124 when it failed to
sample and examine imported misbranded sodium thiopental for use in lethal injections. 125 The
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia upheld a district court order requiring the FDA to
enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act but vacated the order requiring the FDA to seize the
drugs already held by the states because the states were not a named party to the suit.126 In
particular, the DC Circuit found the FDA was required to:
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(1) sample “any drugs” that have been “manufactured, prepared propagated,
compounded, or processed” in an unregistered establishment and (2) examine the
samples and determine whether any “appears” to violate the prohibitions listed in
§ 381(a)(1)-(3). If, “from the examination of such samples or otherwise,’ the
FDA finds an apparent violation of the Act, then it must (3) “refuse[ ] admission”
to the prohibited drug.127
As foreign markets to acquire the drugs have dried up, states have become increasingly
hesitant to release any information about how they have obtained the drugs.

Recent federal

cases such as Landrigan v. Brewer,128 In re Lombardi,129 and Schad v. Brewer130 show how far
the states are willing to go in order to limit access to information regarding lethal injection drugs.
In particular, the states have attempted, with varying success, to deny access to the name of the
manufacturer and how the state acquired the drug.131

As will be discussed in subsequent

sections, the information concerning the drugs is vital for the defendant seeking to make a valid
Eighth Amendment claim. By denying access to the information, the states have forced defense
lawyers to find new arrows for their quiver of legal arguments and pushed Eighth Amendment
“cruel and unusual punishment” litigation towards the realm of First Amendment Right of
Access.
Part II
An analysis of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning capital punishment starts
with the language of the Eighth Amendment. The text provides: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”132 Of
particular interest, the ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” has been the crux of all
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arguments concerning the death penalty.133 The addition of the phrase to the Amendment,
however, was viewed as “constitutional boilerplate” and generated little debate during
ratification.134 The phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” comes word-for-word from the
English Bill of Rights, adopted after the Glorious Revolution in 1689.135 While the language
appears on its face fairly straight forward, the Supreme Court’s definition and understanding of
“cruel and unusual” has evolved over time.
One of the first Supreme Court cases to deal with the “cruel and unusual punishment”
clause was Wilkerson v. Utah.136

A jury convicted Wilkerson of first degree murder.137

Subsequently, the trial judge sentenced him to “be publicly shout [sic] until [he is] dead.”138
Wilkerson challenged the use of a firing squad. At the time, federal law had limited the
sentencing power of federal courts to imposing death by hanging only.139 The Utah Territory
had enacted legislation in 1852 which authorized execution by firing squad, hanging, or
beheading.140 In 1876, the territorial legislature passed a new statute that punished first degree
murder with death but did not prescribe the means of execution from which the judge was to
choose. Wilkerson attempted to argue that the limits placed on federal judges superseded state
methods.141 The Court rejected that argument by noting that traditionally capital punishment has
been carried out in courts-martial by either shooting or hanging.142 Next, the Court addressed
concerns about the constitutionality of shooting under the Eighth Amendment. While attempting
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to outline “cruel and unusual,” the Court noted that “[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define
with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted.”143

At a minimum, punishments of torture that are

unnecessarily cruel, such as being hanged, drawn, and quartered, are not permitted under the
Eighth Amendment.144 The Court held that the sentencing judge was within his power to
sentence Wilkerson to death by firing squad because the sentence did not pass over to the realm
of cruel and unusual.145 One should note the importance the Court placed upon the military’s use
of a firing squad to justify imposing the same sentence on Wilkerson. The Court implicitly
looked to what society deemed an appropriate method of execution, finding justification in its
use by the military.
A few years after deciding on the constitutionality of the firing squad, the Court
determined for the first time the constitutionality of the electric chair.

In re Kemmler146

involved New York State’s attempt to become the first state to execute a man by electricity.
William Kemmler had been sentenced to death for the murder of Matilda Zeigler.147 Kemmler
put forth a simple argument that the use of electricity for his execution violated the prohibition of
“cruel and unusual” punishment.148 The lower courts deferred to the judgments of the New York
legislature that had determined “that the use of electricity as an agency for producing death
constituted a more humane method of executing the judgment of the court in capital cases.”149
Building off of the definition used in Wilkerson, the Court went on to describe the parameters of
the “cruel and unusual” clause:
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Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.150
Ultimately, the Court upheld New York’s statute authorizing the electric chair under a highly
deferential standard toward both the state legislature and the state courts. 151 The Court reasoned
that the legislature had apprised itself of all of the facts necessary to determine that the electric
chair consisted of a humane mode of execution.152 By relying on the legislative findings of the
New York legislature, the Court gave a nod towards the use of social mores as a means for
defining “cruel and unusual” punishment. Indeed, the stimulus for using the electric chair grew
out of a belief that hanging was a barbarous relic of the Dark Ages. 153 “Cruel and unusual,”
therefore, could change based upon legislative findings.
The next two cases of significance in terms of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence actually
did not involve the death penalty. The first case, Weems v. United States,154 involved a case
arising from the then-United States Territory of the Philippine Islands. Weems, a member of the
Coast Guard, had falsified public documents in order to embezzle government funds.155 Upon
his conviction, Weems was sentenced to a minimum of “confinement in a penal institution for
twelve years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor,
no assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights or
property…”156 Weems argued that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.157
After discussing the nature of the punishment, the Court asserted that a cornerstone of the
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American penal system “is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense.”158 The Court attempted to give deference to the penalty because
the legislature had duly enacted the statute authorizing the penalty.159 However, the Court could
not reconcile the statute with the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.160
Weems demonstrates the Supreme Court’s first steps towards accepting the concept of
proportionality within the definition of “cruel and unusual.”
The second case not to involve the death penalty was Trop v. Dulles in which the Court
declared unconstitutional a statute that authorized the denationalization of convicted military
deserters.161 While serving as a private in the Army during World War II, Trop was confined to
a stockade in Casablanca.162

Trop escaped but returned the next day.163

A court-martial

convicted him of desertion and “sentenced him to three years of hard labor, forfeiture of all pay
and allowances and a dishonorable discharge.”164 In addition, he was stripped of his status as an
American citizen.165 After the war, upon denial of a passport application, Trop challenged the
last aspect of his sentence.166 After declaring the authorizing statute penal in nature, the Court
analyzed the denationalization of Trop in light of the Eighth Amendment. 167 Although desertion
during time of war is punishable by death, the Court stated that “the existence of the death
penalty is not a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within the
limit of its imagination.”168 On the contrary, the Court used the opportunity presented by Trop’s
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case to add more defined boundaries to the ambiguity present in the Eighth Amendment. The
Court stated:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands
to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.
Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the
enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional
penalties is constitutionally suspect.169
Here, the Court fully embraced the concept of proportionality in determining the constitutionality
of a punishment, but couches the terms in ensuring humane punishment. The Court further
declared that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”170 The definition of cruel and unusual
punishment changes as the values of society evolves. In adopting this view, the Court embraced
the ambiguity in attempting to define the Seventeenth Century phrase in terms of, what was at
that point, Twentieth Century life.
One should also note in particular that the Court rejected denationalization because “[t]he
civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as
punishment for crime.”171 Not only will the Court consider the American people’s standard of
decency when considering the Eighth Amendment, but the Court made clear that the Court will
also consider the opinions from other countries.

In so doing, the Court gave the Eighth

Amendment a universal aspect to it. Rooted in the dignity of men, the Amendment nevertheless
is not stagnant because society changes its definition of cruel and unusual. At the same time, the
definition of dignity of men cannot be limited to the singular American outlook. The Court
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recognized that the concept of human dignity transcends national borders, requiring comparison
in order for the country to judge properly its ever changing social mores.
In 1972, the Supreme Court issued a fractured decision that for the first time called into
question the validity of the death penalty as a means of punishment. Furman v. Georgia172
contained a concise per curium opinion that held that “the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in [the underlying cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments.”173

Nine separate opinions followed the five-four

decision. Of the five judges who concurred with the decision only two held capital punishment
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment: Justices Brennan and Marshall. The other three
concurring justices held that the imposition of capital punishment unconstitutional as currently
instituted, leaving the door open for a constitutionally acceptable system by which a state could
impose the death penalty.
Of the various opinions within Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall’s presents an
interesting theory on public support for capital punishment. In what has become known as the
“Marshall Hypothesis,”174 Justice Marshall contended that Americans would reject capital
punishment if they knew all of the facts surrounding its application. 175 Before introducing his
theory on public attitudes on capital punishment, Justice Marshall provided a history of the
formation of the “cruel and unusual” clause and the Court’s interpretation.176 Justice Marshall
then discussed of the constitutionality of capital punishment by downplaying past decisions on
the legitimacy of capital punishment:
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The fact, therefore, that the Court, or individual Justices, may have in the past
expressed an opinion that the death penalty is constitutional is not now binding on
us… There is no holding directly on point, and the very nature of the Eighth
Amendment would dictate that unless a very recent decision existed, stare decisis
would bow to changing values, and the question of the constitutionality of capital
punishment at a given moment would remain open.177
For Justice Marshall, because the interpretation of the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause
relies upon the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”178
current public perception of “cruel and unusual” outweighs any prior Court decision.
In order to guide his analysis on the constitutionality of the death penalty, Justice
Marshall put forth four reasons for finding a punishment unconstitutional, similar to those
advocated by Justice Brennan.179 In the first category, Justice Marshall placed “punishments that
inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate
them,” which at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment were outlawed. 180 Next,
Justice Marshall identified “punishments that are unusual, signifying that they were previously
unknown as penalties for a given offense.”181 The third category comprised penalties that are
“excessive and serve[] no valid legislative purpose”182 because “[t]he entire thrust of the Eighth
Amendment is… against that which is excessive.”183 The fourth and final category consisted of
punishments invalidated because “popular sentiment abhors it.”184 Since capital punishment had
enjoyed validity since the founding of the country, Justice Marshall focused his inquiry on
whether capital punishment fell within one of his two remaining categories.185 Eventually,
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Justice Marshall concluded that the death penalty does not serve a valid penological purpose and
in fact “is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment.”186
Justice Marshall continued his analysis by discussing public opinion of capital
punishment. A proper gauge of the public’s opinion on the death penalty requires the public to
know all of the information surrounding it:
…[T]he question with which we must deal is not whether a substantial portion of
American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is
barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light of all
information presently available.187
Justice Marshall recognized that the public has very little information concerning capital
punishment and would seem to base most of its ideas concerning capital punishment on a
perceived need for retribution.188 Justice Marshall pointed to the great depth of discrimination in
the death penalty’s application—against minorities, the poor, even based upon gender.189
Moreover, the public fails to recognize that the death penalty’s finality has led to the deaths of
people later discovered to be innocent.190 Finally, the public does not know the effect the death
penalty has on the legal system as a whole by sensationalizing crimes and serves as an
impediment for prison reform.191 If the public had knowledge of the flaws inherent in capital
punishment, Justice Marshall believed the public would “find it shocking to [its] conscience and
sense of justice.”192
Justice Marshall’s theory assumes the public has complete access to all the information
surrounding capital punishment and if the public lacks immediate access, the government would
willingly provide all of the information. In order for the average citizen to become enlightened
186
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as to the cruel and unusual elements of the death penalty, the government must share the
information with him.
retribution.”193

Otherwise, the public remains ignorant, relying on its “desire for

If the definition of the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause relies upon

society’s evolving standards of decency, and as Justice Marshall suggests, complete information
on all aspects of the death penalty helps society develop its standards of decency, then public
access to information concerning the death penalty becomes key to the evolution of the definition
of cruel and unusual. By limiting access to information concerning the death penalty, the
government stems the evolving definition of cruel and unusual punishment, keeping a supposed
fluid standard at a particular moment in time perhaps no longer applicable.
The end of the death penalty in the United States lasted until the Court decided Gregg v.
Georgia194 four years later. Another fractured decision, Justice Stewart announced the decision
for the court which upheld Georgia’s reworked death penalty statute which created a bifurcated
jury process for deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty.195 Unlike Justice Marshall,
Justice Stewart found guidance in past decisions which focused on the method used to execute
the prisoner rather than the constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole.196 Although Justice
Stewart accepted the evolving nature of the Eighth Amendment, he did not apply it to the
punishment of death, but limited its application to the method.197 Still, Justice Stewart applied a
two part test: “First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime.”198 Nevertheless, the Court must defer to the decisions of the legislature:
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We may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so
long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the
crime involved. And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the
judgment of the representatives of the people.199
As representatives of the people, the legislature stands in a good position to know the public’s
opinion of the death penalty. The Court also looked to the history of the United States and found
the imposition of the death penalty since the country’s beginning.200 Moreover, the concerns of
the death penalty’s discriminatory application can be rectified through “a carefully drafted statute
that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance.”201 Justice
Stewart’s deference to the legislature and reliance on history limits the definition of “cruel and
unusual” in a way that does not question the sentence but only the method for imposing the
sentence. The death penalty itself, because of its historical acceptance, does not face scrutiny
under the evolving standards of decency.
Justice Marshall’s dissent in Gregg reiterated his position in Furman.

For Justice

Marshall, the enactment of new death penalty legislation post-Furman does not indicate public
support.202 Once again, the crux of Justice Marshall’s argument lies with the need for the public
to have all the information about the death penalty: “But if constitutionality of the death penalty
turns, as I have urged, on the opinion of an informed citizenry, then even the enactment of new
death statutes cannot be viewed as conclusive.”203 Citing a study about public perception of the
death penalty after the enactment of the new statutes, Justice Marshall argued that the average
citizen still lacked full information about capital punishment.204 Similarly, Justice Marshall
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questioned the need for the death penalty when an alternative—life imprisonment—exists.205
Finally, Justice Marshall criticized what he saw as a punishment based solely on retribution.206
Once again, Justice Marshall focused on the ignorance of the public in forming its opinion.
Information would conceivably create a vocal majority against the death penalty within the
country.
In the years subsequent to Gregg v. Georgia, the Court accepted the basic premise of the
death penalty as constitutional, but limited its application to certain procedures and toward
certain classes of offenders. The Burger Court “indicated that states may enact capital statutes
provided that application is limited to clearly defined classes of murder, and that due process
requirements have been followed.”207 An early case during the Rehnquist Court explained the
state of Eighth Amendment with regards to capital punishment:
First, there is a required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be
imposed. In this context, the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the
decision maker’s judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular
defendant’s case meet the threshold. Moreover, a societal consensus that the
death penalty is disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a State from
imposing the death penalty for that offense. Second, States cannot limit the
sentencer’s consideration of any relevant circumstances that could cause it to
decline to impose the penalty. In this respect, the State cannot channel the
sentencer’s discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant information
offered by the defendant.208
This analysis shifts the focus from the constitutionality of the death penalty itself to the
application of the death penalty. While societal attitudes may change and impact how to
administer the death penalty, society’s attitude toward the punishment itself, on a general scale,
does not matter. Post-Gregg, the Court limited the application of the death penalty, striking
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down its use as a punishment for rape of an adult woman209 as well as the rape of a minor;210
declaring the execution of mentally retarded offenders unconstitutional;211 and barring the
execution of offenders who committed their offense while still a minor.212 In each decision, the
Court envisioned the Eighth Amendment as allowing the death penalty but with specific
limitations for its use.
More recently, in Baze v. Rees,213 the Court addressed the constitutionality of a particular
method for executing an offender.

Death row inmates from Kentucky challenged the

constitutionality of the state’s lethal injection protocol.214 The inmates contended that “because
of the risk that the protocol’s terms might not be properly followed, resulting in significant pain”
the procedures violated the Eighth Amendment.215 Ultimately, the Court rejected the petitioner’s
claims. Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice Roberts addressed the general proposition of capital
punishment:
Capital punishment is constitutional… it necessarily follows that there must be a
means of carrying it out. Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of
execution—no matter how humane—if only from the prospect of error in
following the required procedure. It is clear, then that the Constitution does not
demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions.216
Once again, the inquiry accepts the constitutionality of the death penalty, leaving in dispute only
the method through which to challenge the sentence. Here, the inmates tried to have Kentucky’s
method declared “cruel and unusual” by comparing it to a proposed method with less of a risk
for mishap and resulting pain.217 The plurality rejected this argument. The possibility of pain
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does not rise to the level of “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment; the Amendment
bars “wanton exposure to objectively intolerable risk.”218

Instead, Chief Justice Roberts

provided a test for inmates proposing alternative execution procedures:
To qualify, the alternative procedure must be feasible, readily implemented, and
in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. If a State refuses to
adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without a
legitimate penological justification for adhering to its current method of
execution, then a State’s refusal to change its method can be viewed as “cruel and
unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.219
The societal views on capital punishment serve as less of a factor because the Court has
acknowledged the constitutionality of the capital punishment. Instead, the burden rests on the
inmate to demonstrate the procedure is unconstitutional by providing an alternative. Moreover,
the inmate must show a refusal on the part of the State to change the procedures. By focusing on
the procedures, the capital punishment inquiry does not address the larger constitutional question
of capital punishment itself. Nevertheless, access to information still plays an important role. In
order for the inmate to challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty procedure or to
propose a different procedure, the inmate must first know all the facts of the State’s death
penalty procedures. While public opinion is not an important factor in Chief Justice Robert’s
analysis, information and access to information remains at the center of any challenge to capital
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Part III
Of the various provisions contained in the First Amendment, the Right of Access finds its
basis within the right of free speech. In pertinent part, the Amendment provides: “Congress shall
make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”220 The Constitution ensures
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that the citizens retain sovereignty over the government; as such, the citizen needs information to
make the best decisions.221 The First Amendment ensures that “[w]hen he decides an issue, he is
entitled to information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that
issue.”222 By ensuring the free flow of information to the citizenry, the Constitution provides for
meaningful oversight of the government by the people and promotes accountability.
For a time, the Supreme Court flirted with finding a Right of Access to the courts
inherent in the Sixth Amendment, which ensures the right to a “speedy and public trial.”223 The
1948 Supreme Court case of In re Oliver224 involved the denial of an inmate’s habeas corpus
petition by the Michigan State Supreme Court. The inmate had been convicted of contempt of
court during a judge-grand jury hearing.225 At the time, Michigan had in place a grand jury
system in which a judge sat as the sole fact-finder.226 The secretive nature of the grand jury led
to the inmate’s conviction for contempt of court behind closed doors without the benefit of
counsel.227 The Supreme Court held that such a proceeding violated the inmate’s right to a
public trial.228 The Court reasoned that the public trial serves “as a safeguard against any attempt
to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is
subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on
possible abuse of judicial power.”229 Certain court proceedings could be held in chambers, but
the majority of proceedings remained opened to the public.230 Although a court had great powers
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to ensure the dignity of the court through contempt proceedings, the use of contempt still must
abide by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial.231
While In re Oliver opened the door to a right to public court proceedings, Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale232 limited the Sixth Amendment’s application to the defendant alone. During the
pre-trial hearings of a murder case, local newspapers sought access to the court room to report on
the proceedings.233

The Supreme Court upheld the denial of access to the press because

“members of the public have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
to attend criminal trials.”234 According to the Court, the public-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment attaches to the individual for his or her own benefit, rather than serving as some
general public right.235 The defendant, and not a third party, must assert a Sixth Amendment
public-trial claim. By limiting the Sixth Amendment to the individual, the Court undercuts the
power of the public to serve as “an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.”236
Nevertheless, the Sixth Amendment does not stand for general rights, forcing litigants to find
another means for ensuring government accountability within the criminal justice system.
One of the first inklings from the Supreme Court of any type of Right of Access came in
the case Zemel v. Rusk.237 The majority denied the appellant’s visa application to visit Cuba,
finding that “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information.”238 The government can restrict travel to both domestic and international
areas if access “would directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the area or
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the nation as a whole.”239 Although the majority rejected the Right of Access argument, Justice
Douglas, in his dissent, laid the basis from which later courts would construct a First
Amendment Right of Access. Justice Douglas explained his theory behind the First Amendment:
The right to know, to converse with others, to consult with them, to observe
social, physical, political and other phenomena abroad as at home gives meaning
and substance to freedom of expression and freedom of press. Without those
contacts, First Amendment rights would suffer.240
For the First Amendment to have any force, people must have access to the information.
According to Justice Douglas access to the information and to different places permits the free
flow of ideas. Interesting to note, in the first iteration, the right of access theory has little to do
with government oversight, but the general First Amendment idea of the marketplace of ideas.
During the 1970s, the Supreme Court issued a series of opinions pertaining to the limits
of a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. In two cases decided on the same day,241 the Court
deferred to prison administrators’ experience when regulations touch upon inmates’ First
Amendment rights. In Pell v. Procunier, the Court upheld regulations that denied reporters
interviews with inmates of their choice.242 The Court’s inquiry began with the proposition that
inmates retain “those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with [their status as
prisoners] or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” 243 Thus,
Courts must perform a balancing test in determining the constitutionality of prison regulations
that impede prisoner contact. The Court reasoned that:
Institutional considerations, such as security and related administrative problems
as well as the accepted and legitimate policy objectives of the corrections system
itself, require that some limitations be placed on [visitations to prisoners]. So
long as reasonable and effective means of communication remain open and no
239

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 24 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
241
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
242
Pell, 417 U.S. at 835.
243
Id. at 822.
240

34

discrimination in terms of content is involved, we believe that in drawing such
lines prison officials must be accorded latitude.244
Since the prison officials permitted the prisoners to communicate to outside sources through
letters, the Court held the regulations did not violate the First Amendment rights of the
prisoners.245 In response to the claims brought by newspaper reporters requesting access to the
prisoners, however, the Court held that “[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public… The Constitution does not
require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of
the public generally.”246 The Court reiterated this view in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. The
Court reasoned that because the prison policy in question did not deny access to information
available to the general public, the regulations did not infringe upon the First Amendment.247
The two companion cases were announced with two separate dissents. In his Pell dissent,
Justice Douglas argued for a right of access for the press to gather information from inmates.248
While he accepted the majority’s balancing test, Justice Douglas did not believe the interest in
prison discipline permitted the blanket ban on interviews to reporters.249 Justice Douglas also
advocated for a reading of the Free Press Clause based upon the public need for information
about public institutions and the press as the means by which the public will receive that
information.250 In particular, Justice Douglas noted: “Prisons… are ultimately the responsibility
of the populace. Crime… is a matter of grave concern in our society and our people have a right
and the necessity to know not only of the incidence of crime but of the effectiveness of the
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system designed to control it.”251 The press needs access to the information in order to fulfill its
duty to ensure an informed public. In his Saxbe dissent, Justice Powell further explained the role
of the press within the First Amendment: “The underlying right is the right of the public
generally. The press is the necessary representative of the public’s interest in this contest and the
instrumentality which effects the public’s right.”252 Although neither Justice Douglas nor Justice
Powell explicitly found a public right of access within the First Amendment, their dissents
definitely recognize the special relationship the press has with the public. For an informed
public to participate in the democratic process, the public needs access to information about the
government. Through the press, the public receives the information necessary to make informed
decisions. Therefore, the press needs access to government information not accessible to the
general public.
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Houchins v. KQED, Inc.253 which arose from
attempts by reporters to gain access to prisoners. After the suicide of an inmate at a county jail,
the local television station sought to inspect and take pictures of the facility.254 When prison
officials refused, the television station brought a First Amendment claim.255

The Court

eventually rejected the claim, finding that “[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information
within the government’s control… the media have no special right of access… different from or
greater than that accorded the public generally.”256 The Court did recognize the important place
the media has in American society. “[A]cting as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the public, they can be a
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powerful and constructive force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public
business.”257 However, the Court did not recognize the existence of any First Amendment Right
of Access. While the media could help to inform the public, reporters did not necessarily have to
rely on their own inspection of the prisons or interviews of prisoners. The public had access to
information through communications inmates had with family members as well as citizen task
forces, which inspected the facilities.258
In his dissent, Justice Stevens offered a wider reading of the First Amendment.
According to Justice Stevens, the First Amendment, at its core, protects the free exchange of
information.259 As such, the First Amendment has a dual purpose, protecting “not only the
dissemination but also the receipt of information and ideas.260 Moreover, the free flow of
information ensures the success of the American democratic system predicated upon “the
existence of an informed citizenry.”261 Justice Stevens argued: “Without some protection for the
acquisition of information about the operation of public institutions such as prisons by the public
at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of all its
substance.”262 With access to information about the prisons, the public can better oversee its
governments. Here, Justice Stevens ties the First Amendment to the notion of public oversight
of the government. The access to information enables the public to better assert its constitutional
rights in the face of government violations.

Constitutional rights do not disappear once

individuals are imprisoned. Justice Stevens noted:
While a ward of the State and subject to its stern discipline, he retains
constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment… a protection
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which may derive more practical support from access to information about
prisons by the public than by occasional litigation in a busy court.263
Using Justice Stevens’ reasoning, the First Amendment becomes an important tool in the
public’s duty to oversee the government. Through access to information, the public can ensure
the government does not infringe upon the rights of even the least politically powerful.
With the plurality decision of Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,264 the Supreme Court
found a public right of access to government proceedings within the First Amendment. During a
high profile murder trial, the judge had closed his courtroom to the public.265 In response, the
local newspaper sued to reopen the trial.266 After stressing the traditionally public nature of trials
in the United States, Chief Justice Burger described the First Amendment as a means to ensure
government accountability. The various provisions of the First Amendment “share a common
core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government.”267

The press relates the events of a trial to the people, alerting the people to

miscarriages of justice. Although the First Amendment makes no explicit mention of the Right
of Access, to permit the government to limit access to proceedings would undermine the concept
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.268
Perhaps the more important opinion issued in Richmond Newspapers came from Justice
Brennan. While the Chief Justice proclaimed a First Amendment Right of Access, he noted the
government could limit access provided “an overriding interest” existed.269 Justice Brennan
described a test for when the government could limit public access. According to Justice
Brennan, the First Amendment “has a structural play in securing and fostering our republican
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system of self-government.”270 Because of the structural role of the First Amendment, the
government may not interfere with “meaningful communication” that informs the public.271 In
deciding Right of Access cases, Justice Brennan offered a two part test. First, courts should
consider whether there exists “an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular
proceedings or information.”272 Next, courts should consider “whether access to a particular
government process is important in terms of that very process.”273 In the context of Richmond
Newspapers, Justice Brennan noted the long history of public trials.274 Under the second prong,
Justice Brennan noted the important role open trials serve “in furthering the efforts of our
judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and accurate adjudication of guilt or
innocence.”275 Denying access to the trial undermines the entire legal system. Justice Brennan
wrote:
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process.
Open trial assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is
afforded equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness,
which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public access is essential, therefore, if
trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining public confidence in
the administration of justice.276
Using his test, Justice Brennan found that trials should be open to the public.

Of more

importance, Justice Brennan provided a method of analysis with farther reaching application.
Although Chief Justice Burger relied heavily upon the tradition of public trials to justify a Right
of Access, Justice Brennan looks beyond, accepting the Right of Access as a given and then
moving to define the Right’s limits.
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Two years later, the Court adopted Justice Brennan’s test in Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court.277 However, Justice Brennan noted the limited nature of the Right of Access.278
The State must provide “weighty” justifications for limiting access. 279 Specifically, to deny
access, the State must show that “denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest,
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”280

Globe Newspaper Co. involved a

Massachusetts statute that limited access to all trials involving the rape of minors.281 The State
argued that the statute protected minors from further trauma.282 While the reason provided by
the State had some merit, the Court found that the statute in question went too far because of its
mandatory application.283 The Right of Access may have limitations, but the State has a heavy
burden if it seeks to limit that right.
Throughout the Right of Access line of cases, the Court never explicitly dealt with public
access to the execution itself. That is not to say that the Supreme Court has never had the
opportunity to address the issue. In 1890, the Supreme Court considered Minnesota’s execution
authorization statute in Holden v. Minnesota.284 The statute limited the means of execution to
hanging “within the walls of the jail” or “within an enclosure which shall be higher than the
gallows, and shall exclude the view of persons outside.”285 The statute permitted the presence of
select witnesses provided “no person so admitted shall be a newspaper reporter or
representative.”286 Moreover, newspapers could not publish an account of the execution “beyond
the statement of the fact that such convict was on the day in question duly executed according to
277
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law.”287 Such restrictions would seem incongruous with First Amendment principles; however,
the challenge to the statute focused on whether a section imposing a period of solitary
confinement upon the prisoner prior to his or her execution violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.288
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute because “it only prescribed the hour of the day before
which, and the manner in which, the punishment of hanging shall be inflicted.”289 The Court
then proceeded to find the other regulations of the statute constitutional:
Whether a convict, sentenced to death, shall be executed before or after sunrise, or
within or without the walls of the jail, or within or outside of some other
enclosure, and whether the enclosure within which he is executed shall be higher
than the gallows, thus excluding the views of persons outside, are regulations that
do not affect his substantial rights. The same observation may be made touching
the restriction… as to the number and character of those who may witness the
execution, and the exclusion altogether of reporters or representatives of
newspapers. These are regulations which the legislature, in its wisdom, and for
the public good, could legally prescribe in respect to executions occurring after
the passage of the act…290
While upholding the statute, the Court does not even consider the First Amendment implications
of private executions. Indeed, the entire concept of a Right of Access has yet to enter into the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Although the Court validates private execution statutes, the
Court does so in passing. The Court has since never broached the concept of private execution
laws nor has the Court overturned Holden. However, the case’s applicability to any Right of
Access challenge to modern execution procedures would seem miniscule in light of more recent
Supreme Court cases—most notably the analysis adopted by the Court in Globe Newspaper Co.
Part IV
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Two recent lower court decisions addressed the connection between the First Amendment
Right of Access and the Eighth Amendment: In re Lombardi291 and Schad v. Brewer.292 This
section will begin with a brief reiteration of the drug shortages facing states. Next, the section
will explore the litigation tactics used by the inmates and the varying degree of success the
inmates have had. The final section will argue for the extension of the Right of Access to the
protocols surrounding capital punishment.
In recent years, death penalty states have had difficulty procuring the drugs traditionally
used in lethal injection procedures. The European manufacturers of the drugs have stopped
manufacturing the drugs in an effort to curtail the supply in the United States. Consequently,
states have had to turn to alternative methods to either acquire the drugs or to carry out the lethal
injection procedure. Some states have resorted to using compound pharmacists to manufacture
the necessary drugs. Other states have used more questionable methods to import the drugs. The
end result has been the same for each state: a shortage in the supply of the lethal injection drugs.
As states have struggled to acquire the drugs, they have also become less transparent with
regards to lethal injection procedures. In particular, states have sought to shield the public from
information about the sources of the drugs. Missouri and Arizona have similar provisions to
limit access to information about the execution procedures.

Specifically, states shield the

identities of the executioners, as defined by the state. In the face of drug shortages, states have
sought to expand the definition of the executioner. Defendants have responded, with varying
success, with new tactics to acquire shielded information.
A. In re Lombardi
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Missouri’s death penalty statute grants discretion to the Director of the Missouri
Department of Corrections to devise the lethal injection protocol.293 The Director also chooses
the members of the “execution team” comprised of “those persons who administer lethal gas or
lethal chemicals and those persons such as medical personnel, who provide direct support for the
administration of lethal injection chemicals.”294 The chosen execution protocol “that directly
relates to the administration of … lethal chemicals” remains open to the public.295 However,
other elements of the execution remain confidential, such as the “identities of members of the
execution team” and execution protocols not directly related to the actual administration of the
drugs.296
In response to the dwindling supply of lethal injection drugs, Missouri’s Director “issued
a new execution protocol in May 2012 that called for the injection of two grams of propofol.” 297
However, the Director abandoned the use of propofol in October 2013 because its use as an
anesthetic in surgical procedures could be jeopardized by resulting European Union trade
restrictions.298 Consequently, Missouri adopted new procedures that replaced propofol with
pentobaribital.299 Missouri also added the compound pharmacy responsible for providing the
pentobaribital to the execution team.300
In 2012, death row inmates in Missouri sued the Director alleging that the new protocol
violated the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.301

After Missouri

revised its lethal injection protocol, the inmates filed an amended complaint on December 3,
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2013, challenging “the current protocol and the use of pentobarbital.”302 The district court issued
a discovery order that required “the Director to disclose to counsel for the plaintiffs… the
identities of the physician who provides a prescription for the compounded pentobarbital, the
pharmacist who compounds the pentobarbital used in executions, and the laboratory that tests the
compounded drug.”303 The district court asked the inmates’ attorneys to keep the information
“confidential ‘other than as needed to do the investigation.’”304 The plaintiffs sought to use the
discovery to possibly form the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim, believing that the use of
pentobarbital from a compounding pharmacy “creates a substantial risk of severe pain or an
objectively intolerable risk of severe pain.”305
The Director sought a writ of mandamus from the Eighth Circuit to stop the district court
from enforcing the discovery orders.306 A three-judge panel granted the writ in part, prohibiting
the disclosure of the prescribing physician’s identity.307 However, the Director still needed to
disclose “the identities of the compounding pharmacy and the testing laboratory.”308 The Eighth
Circuit then granted a rehearing en banc.309
The Director put forth two reasons to deny the inmates access to the requested
information. First, the Director argued that the information was protected by Missouri statute.310
Specifically, by declaring the compounding pharmacy and testing laboratory members of the
execution team, the identities fell under the Missouri execution statute, which ensures the
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confidentiality of members of the execution team.311 Second, the Director asserted that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim in the underlying litigation. 312 The plaintiffs did not provide
enough information in their Eighth Amendment complaint to support their claim; therefore, the
district court should not have granted discovery, but should have dismissed the claim. 313 The
Director also feared that disclosure of the information could lead to “collateral consequences”
that would prevent future acquisition of lethal injection drugs.314

If known to the public,

compounding pharmacies might succumb to outside pressure and no longer sell drugs to the
government.315
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Director’s argument that the inmates lacked a claim
that could withstand a motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs failed to show that “the risk of harm
arising from the State’s current lethal-injection protocol is substantial when compared to known
and available alternatives.” Relying on Baze v. Rees, the Court stated:
Where, as here, there is no assertion that the State acts purposefully to inflict
unnecessary pain in the execution process, the Supreme Court recognized only a
limited right under the Eighth Amendment to require the State to change from one
feasible method of execution to another.
…
Without a plausible allegation of a feasible and more humane alternative method
of execution, or a purposeful design by the State to inflict unnecessary pain, the
plaintiffs have not stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on the use of
compounded pentobarbital.316
The inmates had hoped to use the information acquired through discovery to support their Eighth
Amendment claims. Without the identity of the compounding pharmacy, the inmates could not
research and ensure the safety of the drugs to be administered during the lethal injection. Caught
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in a Catch-22, the inmates’ claim failed because it did not have the information it sought to
acquire in discovery. Ultimately, In re Lombardi shows the difficulty in not only succeeding on
but also proceeding to discovery of an Eighth Amendment claim without access to all the
information concerning the execution protocols. An Eighth Amendment claim by itself does not
gain the plaintiff access to the execution protocols the state seeks to keep private.
B. Schad v. Brewer
Like Missouri, Arizona’s death penalty statute gives the state department of corrections
leeway in determining the protocols.

The statute limits the method of execution to lethal

injection, but does not define the drugs to be used.317 As such, the Arizona Department of
Corrections makes the ultimate decision on the exact drugs for the execution. Arizona’s death
penalty statute also keeps the identity of the executioner out of the public domain:
The identity of executioners and other persons who participate or perform
ancillary functions in an execution and any information contained in records that
would identify persons is confidential and is not subject to disclosure…318
Two Arizona death row inmates filed a complaint against the governor of Arizona, the
director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, and their respective wardens. 319 The inmates
hoped to receive an injunction from the district court requiring the defendants to disclose the
information about the lethal injection drugs.320 Specifically, the inmates requested to know:
a.
b.
c.
d.

The manufacturer of lethal-injection drugs
The NDCs of lethal-injection drugs
The lot numbers of lethal-injection drugs
The expiration dates of lethal-injection drugs
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e. Documentation indicating that those who will handle pentobarbital or other
controlled substances in the execution have the appropriate DEA authorization
to do so.321
Of particular interest, the inmates did not claim any Eighth Amendment violation, but sought the
information under alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment.322 Unlike the
plaintiffs from In re Lombardi, the plaintiffs did not claim a breach of the Eighth Amendment.
Rather than seek the information through discovery, the plaintiffs in Schad v. Brewer made the
lack of information the basis of their claim.
The plaintiffs had attempted to receive the information outside of litigation. Lawyers for
the plaintiffs wrote two letters over the summer of 2013 requesting information about the lethal
injection protocols.323 The plaintiffs hoped to learn “the name of the manufacturer of the drug,
the brand name of the drug, the expiration date, whether the drug is compounded, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration registrations authorizing the execution team members to handle
controlled substances.”324 The State refused to provide the name of the manufacturer or the
source of the drug, citing the A.R.S. §13-757(C) and its prohibition on the revelation of the
identity of execution team members.325 A public records request by the American Civil Liberties
Union of Arizona succeeded in obtaining “a highly redacted document regarding the acquisition
of the execution drugs,” revealing “only that the drug is Nembutal® that was purchased
sometime in 2011.”326
The conflict surrounding the drug information stemmed from plaintiffs’ perceptions that
Arizona may either not have acquired the drug properly or would use expired drugs. Plaintiffs
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cited Cook v. FDA327 in which the DC Circuit found that the FDA had permitted Arizona,
California, and Tennessee to import lethal injection drugs in violation of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.

At one execution, Arizona had discovered that the drugs to be used had

expired.328 In fact, the plaintiffs alleged that the state’s stockpile of pentobarbital, comprised of
Nembutal®, had expired in March 2013.329 The manufacturer of Nembutal® no longer sold the
drug to departments of corrections, leaving Arizona without a source to acquire the drug
legitimately.330
Plaintiffs’ arguments focused on Arizona’s attempts to conceal the requested information
from the public. First, plaintiffs attempted to establish a right to the information under the First
Amendment.331 According to the plaintiffs, the lack of information leaves plaintiffs “unable to
vindicate any potential Eight Amendment claim that they may have.”332

For their First

Amendment claim, the plaintiffs relied upon California First Amendment Coalition v.
Woodford,333 which recognized a public “right to be informed about how the State and its justice
system implement the most serious punishment a state can exact from a criminal defendant—the
penalty of death.”334 In furtherance of their argument, the plaintiffs noted that Arizona had
previously provided similar information in past public-records proceedings.335

Second, the

plaintiffs claimed that the denial of access to the information “violates their right to due process
and meaningful access to the courts by preventing them from discovering whether they have a
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colorable claim that their executions will be carried out in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.”336
Defendants countered by doubting the ability of the plaintiffs to make an eventual Eighth
Amendment claim.337

Moreover, defendants relied again upon Arizona’s execution statute

which prohibits the disclosure of the executioner’s identity.338 Under the defendant’s arguments,
the drug manufacturers fell under the definition of a “person” for whom the death penalty statute
required confidentiality.339 Defendants also argued that by revealing the information, the sources
of the drugs may become subject to public pressure and attacks. 340 If the information were to
become well-known, the state could find it even more difficult to maintain a supply of lethal
injection drugs.341
The district court rejected the inmates’ due process claim. The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs could not show an actual injury: “Because Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right
to assess whether they have [an Eighth Amendment] claim, they have failed to state a claim for
denial of access to the courts in violation of their due process rights.” 342 However, the court did
accept the First Amendment claim. Relying on California First Amendment Coalition, the
district court found a public right of access under the First Amendment to the drug information
“because there is both an historical tradition with public access to information about the means
of executions and a public importance of public access to that information.”343 Having found a
right to access the information, the Court then determined that Arizona’s attempts to deny access
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to the information lacked a rational relationship to a legitimate penological interest.344 The court
found the defendants’ concerns of possible public backlash to be speculative.345 Moreover, some
requested information, such as the drug expiration date, lot number, or National Drug Code,
would not reveal the manufacturer’s identity.346 In granting plaintiffs’ motion, the court did not
require Arizona to provide all the requested information, for fear of disclosing the executioner’s
identity. Instead, the court ordered the state to disclose:
a.
b.
c.
d.

The manufacturer of lethal injection drugs;
The NDCs of lethal-injection drugs;
The lot numbers of lethal-injection drugs;
The expiration dates of lethal-injection drugs.347

The decision in Schad v. Brewer provides an interesting new twist in death penalty
litigation. As the Schad court implied in rejecting the due process claim, discovery is not a right
for plaintiffs. In order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiffs must have all of the
information prior to filing their complaint for any chance at moving onto the discovery stage of
litigation. When the state appears uncooperative in granting access to lethal injection protocols,
the response should not be grounded in an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiffs’ claim would
most likely not survive a motion for dismissal. Rather, the plaintiffs should look to the First
Amendment as a sword.

Through a right of access claim, the plaintiffs can acquire the

information needed to then bring forth an Eighth Amendment claim with a better potential for
success. Of course, plaintiffs would need to move quickly in the face of possible executions;
however, temporary stays would provide a means of delaying executions.
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After the decision in Schad v. Brewer, the defendants provided the plaintiffs with the
requested information.348 Ultimately, the information could not form the basis of an Eighth
Amendment claim and both plaintiffs were executed.349
C. The Future of Right of Access
Both the public and the condemned inmate have an interest in knowing the exact
procedures used in implementing the death penalty. As such the Right of Access should extend
to the state execution protocols, albeit for different reasons. In terms of the public, society has an
interest in seeing that when the State implements the most severe punishment, the State does so
in keeping with Eighth Amendment principles. Similarly, the condemned individual has an
interest in knowing that when the State executes him or her the State does so humanely. The
idea of the individual right admittedly is a more nuanced argument and rests less upon extension
of Supreme Court precedent and more upon general ideas of morality. In both instances, the
Right of Access should be extended to include all information pertaining to executions.
A public Right of Access to execution information is an extension of the RichmondGlobe theory of court access. Although the Court denied a Right of Access under the Sixth
Amendment, the test articulated by the Court in Globe clearly finds a Right of Access an integral
part of the First Amendment. Applying the Globe test to execution protocols, the argument for
public access to the information becomes more compelling. First, a long history of public access
to executions has existed. True, for the last one hundred-fifty years the states have curtailed the
public’s ability to view executions in the open. However, the public still had access to the
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information as to how the executions took place. Although the hangings of Minnesota occurred
behind closed doors, the public still knew that the state would use the simple rope and gallows to
execute a condemned person. Similarly, as New York prepared to implement the first execution
via electrocution, newspaper articles provided the pubic with detailed accounts of exactly how
the execution would occur. In terms of lethal injections, only in the past few years have states
sought to curtail public access to the information surrounding the implementation of the
execution. The details surrounding execution procedures have traditionally been open to the
public. Under the second prong of the Globe test, access to lethal injection protocols would
seem important to ensure that State executes individuals in a manner consistent with Eighth
Amendment principles. As the Court noted when deciding trial access cases, public access to
execution procedures would ensure the constitutionality of the proceeding and maintain public
confidence in capital punishment.
Of course a fundamental difference exists between the trial and the implementation of
punishment. The Court has consistently deferred to prison officials in cases that challenged
regulations restricting public access to prisoners. However, a key difference exists between such
regulations and the denial of information concerning execution protocols. In seeking access to
the execution protocols, the public does not attempt to conduct interviews with selected prisoners
nor does it attempt to film segments of the prison. The public seeks general information from the
prison officials as to how a government proceeding, perhaps the most grave proceeding, is to be
conducted. In each of the prison access cases, the Court also noted the ability of the public to
obtain the information through other means—citizens committees, prison mail to family
members. State secrecy surrounding execution protocols provides no alternative means for the
public to know the details of the execution itself. Prisoners cannot write letters to family
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members detailing how the state procured the drugs because the state does not provide access to
the information.

Unlike prison conditions, the lethal injection protocols are not readily

observable and capable of dissemination to outside sources by prisoners because the states refuse
to provide the information.
Courts confronted with demands for the information pertaining to the acquisition of lethal
injection drugs have discussed the interest the State has in maintaining the secrecy of the
executioner. Most notably, Chief Judge Kozinski in Landrigan v. Brewer350 argued that states
should protect the drug manufacturers from potential public attacks.351 Chief Judge Kozinski
also seems to accept the need to protect European suppliers from criminal investigations under
the European Union:
Indeed, Arizona had good reasons not to [provide the name of the drug
manufacturer]; just twenty-four hours after the state attorney general conceded the
drug was imported from Great Britain, one journalist suggested the company
might be criminally liable under an EU regulation that makes it illegal to “trade in
certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture, or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.”352
Such arguments not only seem to condone the violation of the laws of other jurisdictions but
also, and more importantly, fail to appreciate the role of the public in the Eighth Amendment’s
evolution. If the public expresses displeasure with a company’s provisioning of the State with
lethal injection drugs, the public does so as a showing of the evolving standards of decency. If a
company chooses to respect public concerns and abstain from lethal injection proceedings, it
does so of its own volition.
The First Amendment Right of Access provides the means through which society can
properly evaluate the evolving standards of decency integral to the Eighth Amendment. As the
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Right of Access gives substance to the Freedom of the Press Clause, so too does it provide
substance for the Eighth Amendment. Society cannot accurately judge the humaneness of
current punishments if it lacks all the information required to do so. By keeping various death
penalty protocols secret, states keep arguments about the constitutionality of lethal injections and
the death penalty as a whole limited.

The Right of Access enables the public to receive

information concerning government proceedings. The free access to all of the information
concerning execution proceedings ensures a true discussion of whether current practices remain
constitutional in light of evolving standards of decency.
When considering whether an individual inmate should be able to assert the Right of
Access on his or her own behalf, one must look beyond the societal benefits of the right. True,
the individual can gain information that will then become subject to public scrutiny through the
open courts. However, something more fundamental should compel the State to provide the
inmate with all information surrounding the execution process, especially when the information
directly pertains to the exact method employed to end the inmate’s life. The inmate cannot
ensure the constitutionality of the punishment if he or she does not know the details of the
method itself. Such secrecy seems contrary to fundamental understandings of morality and
fairness within the punishment stage of the criminal justice system. The individual should know
the details of the punishment that the state will impose upon him or her. When the individual
receives a sentence of a term of imprisonment, the individual can observe the conditions once
inside the prison and report upon them. Executions do not have such benefits. Once the
punishment has been administered, a life ends. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the state to
provide the information in advance.
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Extending the Right of Access to include all information concerning executions does not
come without some limits. For the public, the right would not extend to include access to watch
the execution. Rather, the right would simply require states to disclose the details of the
execution protocols. Likewise, the individual prisoner would have a right to know the means by
which the state will execute him, but not necessarily to broadcast the execution or invite
unlimited guests to view the execution. Such limits take into account the states’ interests in
maintaining order within prisons and are in keeping with the Supreme Court prison access cases
of the 1970s.
Conclusion
This article does not seek to argue against the constitutionality of the death penalty, nor
does it seek to delve into the morality of such a punishment. It seeks to shed light on a potential
new frontier for death penalty litigation—First Amendment Right of Access. Current state
government practices have attempted to obscure from the public the means by which inmates are
executed. By using a First Amendment claim, inmates can combat state obfuscation and perhaps
gain access to information that could form the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Justice Marshall theorized that if the public had all the information concerning the
application and administration of capital punishment, a majority of the public would reject the
punishment. State attempts to keep the protocols surrounding executions outside the public
domain make it difficult to test Justice Marshall’s theory. A Gallup poll released in October
2013 showed the lowest support for the death penalty in forty years at sixty percent in favor of
the punishment.353 However, in that same poll, fifty-two percent of Americans believed the
death penalty is applied fairly and forty percent thought the death penalty was applied
353

Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest in More Than 40 Years, GALLUP POLITICS, Oct. 29, 2013,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/165626/death-penalty-support-lowestyears.aspx?utm_source=add_this&utm_medium=addthis.com&utm_campaign=sharing#.UnAiDq-AZcs.twitter.

55

unfairly.354 The numbers from the polls come when states have actively sought to shield from
the public the exact details of how an inmate is put to death.
The basis of the Eighth Amendment, the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society, is meaningless unless the standards are permitted to evolve. To
do so, society must have access to information, hence, the importance of a First Amendment
Right of Access. Once the information is available, the citizenry can make a fully informed
decision. In the interim, inmates should be able to use the Right of Access as a means to
circumvent the limitations presented by state attempts to keep lethal injection protocols secret.
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